What is protected, and what is not.
The short version of the security model. The docs have the full one, with every signing context and every limit.
Every Kolo library is version 0.1.0, beta and experimental. Only the latest v0.x release of a library receives security fixes. Read the model before you rely on it.
Keys and signatures
A peer is an Ed25519 key. Only its 32-byte seed is stored, in a file written with mode 0600, and the seed is never printed, logged or serialized.
Every signature uses Ed25519 with its own context string, after RFC 8032, so a signature made for one message type never verifies as another. Verification returns false on any bad input and never panics.
Channels
kolo-secure ties a TLS 1.3 connection to both peers' keys. Each side signs the connection's exporter value, so a proof does not verify on another connection, for the other role, or for another pair of peers.
A plain kolo-transport connection has no identity: it protects against passive observers only, and an active man in the middle is not detected. Use kolo-secure when you need to know who is on the other side.
Logs and untrusted input
A reader trusts only the owner's public key and the log ID. Heads, records, proofs and entries can come from any peer, because every one of them is checked against those two values. On any failed check a replica keeps nothing.
Bytes from the network are checked before they are used. Decoding returns an error, never a panic; lengths are checked before anything is allocated; errors never include text the peer sent.
What Kolo does not protect against
- Deletion is best effort. A peer that already received an entry key can keep it, and old copies of a disk can still hold a deleted key.
- A stolen key. There is no forward secrecy or rekeying beyond TLS 1.3.
- Traffic analysis. Addresses, timing and sizes are visible, and a relay sees the metadata of every session it carries.
- Privacy on the DHT. Its traffic is not encrypted, and anyone can announce any topic.
- A kolo-moq relay you run. Connections are encrypted hop by hop by kolo-secure, but the relay can read the media, catalogs and data tracks it forwards. No end-to-end protection exists in v0.1.0.
- A peer with sync access that makes the server read a log again and again. Grant that access only to peers you trust with the load.
The full security model in the docsHow to report a vulnerability